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RECENT CASE NOTES
second, when is the nature of the second suit such that the accomplishment of
its immediate or potential objects or purposes may necessitate an interference
with or prevention of the proper and effective disposition of the first suit? 1 7
The definitive lines of these two concepts can not be drawn with academic
nicety. Each case must be considered separately on its own particular facts
with preference being given to principles of comity that seem to promote
harmony in our judicial system.
The constitutional doctrine of dual form of government has never been
expressly recognized as the basis on which should be predicated decisions
involving this conflicting jurisdiction between state and federal courts. How-
ever, expressions in the cases can be found to the effect that the governing
principles have a higher sanction than one of "utility derived from concord"
or merely of comity. It is said to be "a matter of right and of law." 1 8  Also,
the rules are often expressed in terms of jurisdiction.
It would seem that it could not be a matter of jurisdiction in the more
limited sense. That the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not subject to
diminution or control of state legislation is clear.1 9 Therefore, if in the case
under review, it was a question whether the federal district court had jurisdic-
tion to entertain the suit brought by the beneficiaries of the trust, it would
have been for the United States Supreme Court to have determined by its
own notions the extent of jurisdiction acquired by the state court when the
trustees filed the suit to account. The provisions of the state statute on this
score would have been immaterial.
Even though the constitutional doctrine of dual form of government is
not strictly applicable, the decisions in this field are inarticulately premised
on the same considerations of policy underlying that principle. As an actual
fact, the doctrine is here applied in its Simon-purity, unadulterated by the
premise of federal supremacy. 20 The tendency, if there is one, is the desirable
one of paying more respect to state "jurisdiction" with which the instant case
is in complete accord. J. M. C.
CRIMINAL LAW: EFFECT OF AN IMPOSSIBLE FUTURE DATE IN AN INDI TMENT.
-The defendant was indicted on three counts for his part in a bank robbery
committed December 1, 1934. The indictment was returned and filed on
September 18, 1936. The time of commission of the robbery was stated cor-
rectly in the-first and third counts as "December 15, 1934"; but the second
by the will); Ala. Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co. (1922), 283 Fed. 606.
(Pendency of condemnation proceeding in state court held not to abate similar
proceeding in federal court.) Compare, Dennison Brick Co. v. Chicago Trust
Co. (1923), 286 Fed. 818 (suit to quiet title in state court barred subsequent
suit in federal court to foreclose a mortgage on the same land. The mortgage
could have been foreclosed in the state action.)
17 The instant case is illustrative on this point.
18 Kline v. Burke Const. Co. (1922), 260 U. S. 226, 43 S. Ct. 79.
19 United States v. Howland (1819), 4 Wheat. 108; Mississippi Mills v.
Cohn (1893), 150 U. S. 202, 14 S. Ct. 75.
20 This is more than can be said as to those situations where the United
States Supreme Court has held that the doctrine is strictly applicable. See
Willis, Constitutional Law, p. 236.
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count charged the commission as of a date subsequent to the return and
filing of the indictment, i.e. upon "December 15, 1936," obviously an impossible
date and equally as obvious, a clerical error. A motion to quash was made
and was overruled; exception was taken. Then the prosecuting attorney
amended the erroneous date to conform to the evidence presented and to the
allegations of the other counts. This was done prior to the instructing of the
jury. From a verdict of "guilty" on the second count, Pagotis appealed and
his conviction was reversed. The Supreme Court said that an indictment
which charged a crime to have been committed subsequent to the return thereof
did not state a public offense; that it was bad upon a motion to quash; and
that the error was one which could not be amended. Pagotis v. State (Ind.
1938), 17 N. E. (2d) 830.
The court premised that a count with a future date does not charge a
public offense; and that an amendment to make the count good would neces-
sarily be one substantive in nature, changing the bad to the good; therefore,
a 1935 act permitting amendments in matters of form would be inapplicable.
The court cited several cases as supporting this principle, an analysis of which
is to be found below.1
The Indiana statutes have attempted to make it clear that errors as to
time of commission of a crime are not to be held of a substantive nature.
One applicable statute provides that omitting to state the time at which the
offense was committed in any case in which time is not of the essence, or,
stating the time imperfectly are "immaterial defects" and are not to be the
grounds for quashing nor rendering an indictment invalid. 2 There has been
little attention paid to these provisions, or the interpretation has been so narrow
as to exclude the impossible future date case. Defendant was indicted here
under the accessory and conspiracy statutes, neither of which makes time the
essence of the crime.3
A study of all Indiana cases discloses that there is a clear split of
authority upon the problem. One court has held that an indictment with
1 Ten cases are cited as supporting the court's position.
A. Five are not even treated as impossible future date cases. (1) State
v. Sammons (1884), 95 Ind. 22; no year of commission of offense stated.
(2) Murphy v. State (1886), 106 Ind. 96, 5 N. E. 767; year stated "18184."
(3) State v. McDonald (1886), 106 Ind. 233, 6 N. E. 607; no time of com-
mission stated. (4) Terrell v. State (1905), 165 Ind. 443, 75 N. E. 884;
year of offense dated "18903". (5) Hunt v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 550, 159
N. E. 149; year stated as "nineteen hundred 1923".
B. Two sustain every detail of the court's premise. (1) State v. Noland
(1867), 29 Ind. 214. (2) Shonfield v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 579, 149 N. E. 53.
C. Two hold that the indictment does charge a public offense, though
stating that a motion to quash would lie. (1) Trout v. State (1886), 107
Ind. 578, 8 N. E. 618. (2) Boos v. State (1914), 181 Ind. 562, 75 N. E. 884.
D. One holds exactly contra to the premise it supposedly supports. (1)
State v. Patterson (1888), 116 Ind. 46, 10 N. E. 289.
2Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), § 9-1127. "No indictment shall be deemed in-
valid, nor . . . quashed . . . for any of the following defects;
Eighth. For omitting to state the time at which the offense was com-
mitted in any case in which time is not the essence of the offense, or for stat-
ing the time imperfectly, unless time is the essence of the offense."
3 Accessory statute-Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), § 9-102. Conspiracy statute-
Burns' Ind. Stat. (1933), § 10-1101.
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this impossible future date does charge a public offense, with the result that
a motion to quash would be overruled.4 Other decisions have held that a
motion to quash will be sustained, not discussing whether the grounds for
this was that the indictment did not state a public offense or that the offense
was not charged with sufficient certainty.5 Still others have held the error
to be 'technical" and non-prejudicial to the substantive rights of the defendant
so that upon appeal the appellate court would disregard the error.6
Now if it is held that tl~e count here does charge a public offense, then
the amendment might be made as a matter of form. Our court has held
that the count sufficiently charges a violation of our statutes.7 Moreover, the
alternative theory that the defect is but a technical, non-prejudicial imper-
fection which will be disregarded upon appeal has been advanced. 8 To be a
substantial defect, it must be such as to have misled the defendant; but he
could hardly show this to have been the fact, since he did not try to quash
the second count until after all the evidence had been presented.
In essence, the naked issue here is the one formed by the clash of two con-
flicting basic theories. One would protect the individual by requiring the
State to allege with the greatest exactness and accuracy every point involved
so that the defendant would not be misled. The other policy would eliminate
"technicalities" as a means of escape to one who stands convicted; this is the
modern view.9 Each premise, one emphasizing individual liberty and the
other the promotion of law and order, is of fundamental importance; the
balancing of the two provide the answer to our issue here.
Careful consideration brings the writer to the view that the error here
is by the weight of authority but an immaterial technicality, permissive of
amendment, that our court should eliminate as a basis for reversal of a
conviction. The amendment would not in practice harm the substantive rights
of the defendant; it is unlikely that the clerical error is truly misleading.
Common experience shows that each crime differs factually from others with
the result that no two could be so identical that the defendant could truly
show he was not sufficiently apprised by the count of the exact crime with
which he was being charged.
Precedent from other states amply supports the writer's opinion. The
impossible future date is deemed either an error not vitiating the indict-
ment,1 0 or one which does not mislead the defendant to the prejudice of his
4 State v. Patterson (1888), 116 Ind. 46, 10 N. E. 289.
G State v. Noland (1867), 29 Ind. 214; Shonfield v. State (1925), 196' Ind.
579, 149 N. E. 53.
6 State v. Patterson (1888), 116 Ind. 46, 10 N. E. 289; Boos v. State (1914),
181 Ind. 562, 105 N. E. 117.
7 Trout v. State (1886), 107 Ind. 578, 8 N. E. 618.
8 State v. Patterson (1883), 116 Ind. 46, 10 N. E. 289.
O 14 R. C. L. 172.
10 State v. Ballamah (1922), 28 N. M. 212, 210 P. 391; Van Immons v.
State (1905), 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 681, 19 Ct. Dec. 681; State v. Mowry
(1899), 21 R. I. 376, 43 A. 871; Commonwealth v. Smith (1871), 108 Mass.
486; Cornet v. Commonwealth (1909), 134 Ky. 613, 121 S. W. 424; State
v. Crawford (1885), 66 Iowa 318.
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substantial rights and is to be disregarded upon appeal."1 These courts
concur in the view that the error is but a harmless mistake, to be amended
at any time. W. E. 0.
EQUITABLE SEtVTUDEs--REsTRIcTIoN OF USE OF LAND RETAINED BY VENDOR.-
In 1931 plaintiffs were induced to buy a lot upon verbal assurances that they,
in conjunction with other lot owners, were securing rights to the enjoyment
of an open space from the road to the Atlantic Ocean. An unrecorded plat
was exhibited showing the section as being free of any plan for house lots
and was marked "Community Beach". Admission tickets to the beach were
distributed to the lot owners. In 1935 the area was rented to a public shore
resort. In 1937 a plat was recorded showing the entire area divided into
lots. Plaintiffs seek an injunction against the new use. HELD, injunction
granted. Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, (Md. 1938), 2 A. (2d) 683.
The principal case presents the problem of restricting the use of land re-
tained by the vendor when no mention of the restricted use is made in the
deed or a recorded plat. A restriction of use in favor of adjoining land is an
equitable interest in land within the purview of the Statute of Frauds and is
therefore ordinarily required to be in writing.' In situations analogous to
the principal case, however, three methods have been used whereby the Sta-
tute of Frauds has been circumvented and a desired result obtained; implied
covenant, dedication, and estoppel.
In a case analogous to the principal one, the New Jersey Equity Court
granted the relief prayed for on the ground that "such transactions raise an
implied covenant by the grantor that he will devote the specially designated
lands to the beneficial uses the declaration of which enabled him to sell his
lots'. 2 The New Jersey Court seems to be alone in using the term "implied
covenant" to refer to something other than a provision that can be inferred
from the use of certain words of conveyance.3 If a more logical basis for
relief can be found, it seems desirable as a matter of policy not to extend
11 Faustre v. Commonwealth (1891), 92 Ky. 34, 17 S. W. 189; Cornet
v. Commonwealth (1909), 134 Ky. 613, 121 S. W. 424-; Conner v. State (1858),
25 Ga. 516, 71 Am. Dec. 184; State v. Brooks (1892), 85 Iowa 366, 52 N. W.
240; State v. Carmel (1915), 36 S. D. 293, 154 N. W. 808; State v. Blaisdell
(1879), 49 N. H. 81; State v. Pierre (1887), 39 La. Ann. 916, 3 So. 60; State
v. Thompson (1915), 137 La. 547, 68 So. 949; Smith v. State (Tex. Crim. 1907),
102 S. W. 407.
1Jacksonville Public Service Corp. v. Calhoun Water Co. (1929), 219 Ala.
616, 120 So. 79; Borland v. Walters (1931), 346 Ill. 184, 178 N. E. 184;
Novello v. Caprigno (1931), 276 Mass. 193, 176 N. E. 809; Giddings, Restric-
tions on the Use of Land (1892), 5 Harv. L. Rev. 274.
2Bridgewater v. Ocean City Railroad Co. (1901), 62 N. J. Eq. 276, 49
A. 801, aff'd, 63 N. J. Eq. 798, 52 A. 1130.
SMcDonough v. Martin (1892), 88 Ga. 675, 16 S. E. 59; Baltimore v.
Frick (1895), 82 Md. 83, 33 A. 628; Rawle on Covenants for Title (1887),
Ch. XII; I Tiffany on Real Property (2nd ed., 1920) 124. The several'New
Jersey cases relying on an implied covenant as the basis for granting relief
relate to the same piece of land. Lennig v. Ocean City Association (1886),
41 N. J. Eq. 606; Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ry. Co. (1901), 62 N. J. Eq.
276, 49 A. 801, af-d, 63 N. J. Eq. 798, 52 A. 1130; Bridgewater v. Ocean
